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THE CONSUMER A.t~D THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION. By Ed-
ward Cox, Robert Fellmeth, and John Schulz. Pp. 161. [Reprinted 
I 15 CONG. REc. E370-99 (daily ed. January 22, 1969).]t 
Many turbulent events crowded the summer of 1968. Student 
power competed with black power for public attention, and par-
ticipatory democracy vied with street confrontations for student 
involvement. At the same time, another, and less spectacular, stu-
dent movement also had its beginning. While some of their brethren 
were urinating into paper sacks or taunting police into unjustifiable 
riot, seven law students1-dubbed "Nader's Raiders" because they 
operated with the guidance of consumer champion Ralph Nader-
sweated through a Washington summer examining the performance 
of the Federal Trade Commission as the protector of the American 
consumer. Their report, released in January 1969, drew headlines 
and evoked favorable editorial comment; indeed, the American Bar 
Association's study of the FTC, undertaken at President Nixon's 
behest, seems a by-product.2 This past summer dozens more students 
flocked to Washington to study, under Nader's leadership, several 
other governmental departments; reports dealing with those agencies 
are promised.3 
The report on the FTC is the subject of this Review. I was 
hesitant to write the Review, not because criticizing Ralph Nader 
may be unpopular (although it does seem rather foolhardy to ques-
tion the wisdom of one portrayed in shining armor on the cover 
of a national news magazine), but because the efforts of Nader's 
students were directed toward improving the system, not toward 
destroying it. They did not "cop out"; they did not picket or en-
gage in violence. Instead, they studied first and then wrote a report. 
Even so, the students are not above criticism. Their verdict was 
t John E. Schulz, the Project Director and now an Assistant Professor at the Uni-
versity of Southern California Law Center, announced at a recent consumer law 
conference that this report would be published, probably under the title, "The Nader 
Report.'' One of his co-authors indicated that it was to be published in September 1969 
by Baron Press, New York. Fellmeth, The Freedom of Information Act and the Federal 
Trade Commission: A Study in Malfeasance, 4 HARV. Crv. RrcHTs-C1v. LIB. L. REv. 345 
n.l (1969). 
I. These students were all from Harvard and Yale; two of the seven graduated 
from law school in June 1968 before commencing the FTC study, and one entered law 
school after his summer experience. 
2. The ABA•appointed commission issued its report as this Review was in the 
final stages of preparation. I have seen only a summary of that report, but it does not 
appear to dispute the basic complaints broadcast by Nader's students. 
3. Recent press conferences and releases indicate that this year's studies will be 
even more critical. In fact, some agencies have already been stung to action. See, e.g., 
Washington Post, Sept. 7, 1969, § A, at I, col. 3. 
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harsh: they found the Commission's performance in the consumer 
arena to be "shockingly poor"; they suggested to the FTC chair-
man, Paul Rand Dixon, that he quit; and they concluded that the 
current system requires substantial overhaul.4 Such judgments de-
mand critical analysis. 
The Nader Report begins by noting that its scope is limited to 
the FTC's "consumer protection activities" both under the FTC 
Act, 5 which prohibits deceptive practices6 and false food and drug 
advertisements,7 and under specialized statutes which condemn flam-
mable fabrics and mislabeled furs and textiles.8 The report concedes 
that it has ignored the Commission's "equally large and important 
... antitrust duties" (p. 4, p. E370)9-apparently on the assumption 
that such activities have a less direct and immediate impact on 
specific consumer transactions, and are therefore less significant to 
the consumer, than consumer protection activities. I wonder. 
Aggressive prosecutions of deceptive practices and false advertis-
ing may improve the consumer's lot in the short term; but even 
Professor Galbraith does not dispute the fact that the single most 
important element determining the consumer's fate is control of the 
basic structure of the American economy, and that such control is 
the major thrust, if not always the impact, of the antitrust laws.10 
As the current inflationary surge has clearly demonstrated,11 relative 
prices and price rises are the primary determinants of consumer 
prosperity. It is precisely at that level that effective antitrust enforce-
ment can have substantial impact. Several studies support this point. 
One such study, for example, estimates that the lost output which 
results from the existence of monopoly costs the American economy 
six per cent of national income annually-about 45 billion dollars 
4. After reflection, the students went even further and called for the abolition of 
the FTC in order to make way for a fresh beginning. BNA ANTITRUST &: T!WlE 
REG. REP. No. 402, at A-12 (March 25, 1969) (testimony before Senate Government 
Operations Subcomm.). 
5. 15 u.s.c. §§ 41-58 (1964). 
6. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(l) (1964). 
7. 15 u.s.c. § 52 (1964). 
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 68-70k, 1192 (1964). 
9. The Commission's original jurisdiction over advertising was "a fortuitous by-
product" of Congress' concern with restraints on trade. G. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL 
TRADE COMMISSION 1-48, 339 (1924). If recent appropriations are a guide, Congress 
has increasingly viewed the Commission's antitrust mandate as its primary responsi-
bility. See, e.g., LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE, REPORT TO HOUSE SELECT COll[IIIITTEE 
ON SMALL BUSINESS, CONGRESS AND THE MONOPOLY PROBLEM 550-51 (1966). 
10. J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967). The report's explanation that 
the "current crisis" in the American economy is the result of the rise of large corpo• 
rate enterprises seems to concede, or at least to support, this conclusion. 
11. NEWSWEEK, Sept. 15, 1969, at 74. 
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per year.12 When applied to all consumers, that amount is four times 
what it would cost to assure every American family an annual in-
come of 3,000 dollars.13 Other commentators have found even that 
estimate conservative; they have shown that the cost of monopoly 
reflected in inflated production costs,14 in the suppression of tech-
nological innovations, 15 and in the redistribution of income from 
the poor to the rich,16 is of a much greater--in fact, staggering-
magnitude. 
In fairness, I do not judge the FTC study by what it expressly 
does not cover. But the omission of the FTC's antitrust enforcement 
cannot be completely overlooked. Despite the students' claims to 
the contrary, the Commission's activities in the "consumer protec-
tion sphere" cannot be fairly evaluated purely on the basis of its 
deceptive advertising regulation. Law students are not graded solely 
on incoherent class performance, and lawyers do not rest a case with 
one witness; similarly, the Commission's consumer protection actions 
should be judged on total performance. Nevertheless, if the Com-
mission's antitrust performance were as unproductive as this report 
judges its "consumer" activities to be, I might be less inclined to 
quarrel with the students' sweeping condemnation of Chairman 
Dixon and his colleagues. Current evidence, however, suggests that 
at least some FTC antitrust enforcement has significantly benefited 
all consumers. An example is the tetracycline price-fixing conspiracy 
which lasted from 1953 to 1966. During that period, drug manufac-
turers did virtually no research in "broad spectrum" drugs, whereas 
during the five preceding years three of the firms involved had intro-
duced four such drugs. More important from the consumer's view, 
developments occurring after 1966, when the FTC ordered that the 
collusion cease, strongly suggest that the pace of innovation has 
quickened.17 
12. D. Kamerschen, An Estimation of the "Welfare Losses" from Monopoly in the 
American Economy, 1964 (unpublished doctoral dissertation available at Michigan 
State University), discussed in Foreword, l ANTITRUST L. 8: EcoN. REv. l (Summer 
1968) and Foreword, 2 ANTITRUST L. 8: EcoN. REv. 1, 2 (Fall 1968). 
13. See Foreword, 2 ANTITRUST L. 8: EcoN. REv. 1, 2 &: n.4 (Fall 1968). 
14. W. Erickson, Price Fixing Under the Sherman Act: Case Studies in Conspiracy, 
1965 (unpublished doctoral dissertation available at Michigan State University) dis-
cussed in Foreword, 2 ANTITRUST L. 8: EcoN. REv. I, 2 (Fall 1968). That study found 
that in the industries examined, conspiracies inflated prices by 35% and costs by 
23% above preconspiracy, that is, competitive, levels. 
15. Costello, The Tetracycline Conspiracy: Structure, Conduct and Performance 
in the Drug Industry, l ANTITRUST L. &: ECON. REV. 13 (Summer 1968). 
16. Foreword, 2 ANTITRUST L. &: EcoN. REv. I, 3 (Fall 1968); Shepherd, Conglomerate 
Mergers in Perspective, 2 ANTITRUST L. & EcoN. REv. 15 (Fall 1968); Martin, Comment, 2 
ANTITRUST L. & EcoN. REv. 43 (Fall 1968). Contra, Weston, Comment on Professor 
Shepherd's Conglomerate Mergers in Perspective, 2 .ANTITRUST L. &: EcoN. REv. 33 
(Fall 1968). 
17. See Costello, supra note 15. 
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After discussing the scope of its concern, the Nader Report con-
centrates on the FTC's efforts to stamp out deceptive practices, but, 
in that regard, the picture it draws is more of foot-dragging than 
of foot-stamping. The students begin with the premise that the 
agency has failed abysmally in fulfilling its responsibilities to con-
sumers. Their aim is a call for action. But despite their obvious bias 
and prejudgment, the authors present a persuasive case. They 
demonstrate that the Commission's method of detecting violations 
by relying on the mailbag for complaints is inadequate; and they 
point out that the FTC frequently issues complaints only because 
of congressional pressure, and that those complaints are usually 
against industrial pygmies who have committed trivial or marginal 
violations. They attack the Commission's prosecutorial delay, during 
which the violator can continue to profit from his deceptions, and its 
system of issuing unsupervised decrees, which permit the convicted 
to go free after a meaningless tongue-lashing. The report analyzes 
these deficiencies in painful detail. The pain comes not from the 
report's statistical and analytical methodology, which in general ap-
pears accurate and reliable; but rather from the stark realization 
that the Commission lacks a program to detect law violations, is 
unable to develop prosecutorial priorities, and engages in no sus-
tained effort to make its orders meaningful by continued vigilance. 
Some might object that many of these facts have been exposed 
before. Indeed, the FTC's preoccupation with trivia, its inordinate 
delay in adjudicatory hearings, its fetish for secrecy, and its failure to 
develop specific and sound policies are common complaints.18 But the 
Nader Report does not stop with re-examining timeworn charges. It 
marks the first time that anyone has so openly or authoritatively con-
demned the misdirection and misuse of FTC power, the staff's de-
moralized condition, or the Commission's political backscratching 
with Congress and industry. Last year's quixotic decision to open 
an FTC field office in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, provides an example. 
18. COMM. ON INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS, U.S. COMl\lN. ON ORGANIZA-
TION OF THE ExEcUTIVE BRANCH, REPORT 125 (Hoover Commn. Task Force Report, 
app. N, 1949): 
As the years have progressed, the [Federal Trade] Commission has become im-
mersed in a multitude of petty problems; it has not probed into new areas of 
anticompetitive practices; it has become increasingly bogged down with cumber-
some procedures and inordinate delays in disposition of cases. . . • The Com-
mission has largely become a passive judicial agency, waiting for cases to come up 
on the docket, under routinized procedures, without active responsibility for 
achieving the statutory objectives. 
See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 2235, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1961); H.R. REP. No. 3236, 81st 
Cong., 2d Sess. 16-20, 84-88 (1951); Auerbach, The Federal Trade Commission: Internal 
Organization and Procedure, 48 MINN. L. REv. 383 (1964); Gellhorn, The Treatment 
of Confidential Information by the Federal Trade Commission: Pretrial Practices, ll6 
U. CHI. L. REv. ll3, 157-77, 181-83 (1968); Note, The Federal Trade Commission and 
Reform of the Administrative Process, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 671, 700-03 (1962); Develop-
ments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1005, 1063-97 (1967). 
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To the outsider it appeared to be a sensible attempt to reach out to 
the rural consumers who were not served by most field offices.19 
But Nader's probing students offer a more plausible explanation. 
They state that the office was created to satisfy the needs of an un-
employed political friend of Congressman Joe Evins of Tennessee, 
the chairman of the House appropriations subcommittee which 
approves the FTC's budget. One might wish for additional docu-
mentation of such personal and political charges, especially since 
many are so damaging. On the other hand, it is surprising how much 
material the students did unearth in three months, since they lacked 
the subpoena power or the other sanctions of an official investigatory 
body. 
Unfortunately, these strengths are often marred by the report's 
substantial defects. Substance can be ruined by style, and loose 
charges will destroy the soundest case. The students are not careful 
advocates. Their conclusions tend to outrun the evidence they have 
marshaled, and, in some cases, their suggestions seem wholly unre-
lated to what has gone before. They foolishly rely on intemperate 
rhetoric designed to raise hackles rather than to persuade doubters. 
Calling for Chairman Dixon's scalp may be effective headline hunt-
ing, but the educated lawyer eschews such tactics. Moreover, it is 
unfair to excoriate Dixon as the sole villain. His authority is not 
without check, and the other commissioners are equally responsible 
for ·whatever consumer record the FTC has compiled. 
If the students' judgment is correct, the Commission's record is a 
sorry one; but the documentation in their report is far too incom-
plete to support any valid conclusion. Of course, waiting until "all 
the evidence is in" would require that one's judgment remain sus-
pended forever, and change would never come. But it is equally 
objectionable to present, as an objective analysis, a study which 
makes no mention of the pro-consumer efforts which the FTC has 
made-efforts that must be considered substantial even if one accepts 
the students' decision to disregard the antitrust area completely.20 
Surely, a middle ground was available. Nor does it seem fair to judge 
19. The Commission's other general field offices are located in metropolitan areas, 
yet they are geographically dispersed in order to enable investigation of possible 
violations throughout the nation. Although there are twelve offices, there is none 
between Kansas City and the West Coast, and cities such as Detroit and Philadelphia 
do not have FTC offices. 
20, See, e.g., Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 11 18,684 (FTC 
1969); Leon A. Tashof, 3 TRADE REG. REP. 11 18,606 (FTC 1968); Consumer Prods. of 
America, 3 TRADE REG. REP. 11 18,059 (FTC 1967), afjd., 400 F.2d 930 (3d Cir. 1968), 
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1088 (1969); Empeco Corp., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE 
REG. REP. 11 17,859 (FTC 1967), afjg. [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 
11 17,805 (Hearing Examiner 1966); FTC, ECONOMIC REPORT ON !NSTALLlllENT CREDIT 
AND RETAIL SALES PRACTICES OF DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RETAILERS (1968); FTC, REPORT 
ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CONSUMER PROTECTION PROGRAM (1968); FTC, Notice of 
Hearings on National Consumer Protection and Education, 33 Fed. Reg. 15,232 (1968). 
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the FTC's past performance by today's consumer standards. Con-
sumerism's rise as a potent political force is of recent origin, and in a 
democratic society a federal administrative agency is, and should be, 
limited by the bounds of political reality. 
The authors' harshest judgment is rendered against the FTC 
staff, which is labeled an inept group of lazy political cronies. Much 
of the supporting evidence, particularly with regard to the General 
Counsel's office, seems indisputable; indeed, the Commission's re-
cent change of General Counsel may be a concession of that point. 
Some of their argument, however, is pure rubbish. For example, 
the report, reversing the traditional American ethic, condemns the 
fact that the chief hearing examiner and most bureau chiefs are 
small town natives. They are said to be insensitive to the consumer 
problems facing urban residents. Yet nowhere is it established, nor 
can it be, that being born or raised in a large community provides 
special wisdom in ferreting out deceptive practices which flourish in 
the big cities. 21 · 
The report also condemns the Commission's hiring practices, par-
ticularly its failure to hire minority group attorneys and graduates 
of prestige law schools. That attack, too, is unfair-at least on the 
basis of the support offered in the report.22 The allegation that the 
Commission has not sought or hired minority group attorneys re-
lies on incomplete information. At the time of the report there 
were five black attorneys on the staff of the FTC not three, as the 
report alleged.23 In any event, it is misleading to suggest that this 
issue can be tested solely by reference to the number of black lawyers 
on the staff or to the number of visits made to Howard Law School. 
The Commission's competitive salary position vis-a-vis that of the 
Justice Department, the attractiveness of the FTC's available posi-
tions in relation to competing government positions,24 and similar 
factors need to be explored before such severe judgments can be 
rendered. The attempt to show anti-prestige-school bias is equally 
weak. For example, it relies in part upon irrelevant data such as Law 
School Admission Test scores, which are designed to predict aca-
demic success in law school, not to measure either academic prowess 
or trial talent. Furthermore, the figures are too fragmentary to sub-
stantiate the charge. 
Most disappointing is that solid investigation is too often fol-
21. Applying this special brand of logic to the authors, of course, would mean that 
they have neither the expertise nor the experience--whether as regulators, as attorneys, 
or as poor consumers-to evaluate the Commission's performance. 
22. In fact, the latter charge seems to reflect the disappointments of these Harvard 
and Yale students-none of whom, incidentally, is black. 
23. Statement of Paul Rand Dixon, 115 CONG. REc. E399, E400 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 
1969). 
24. It is probably true, for example, that the FTC could more easily recruit black 
attorneys if it had a civil rights division. 
November 1969] Recent Books 157 
lowed by ill-conceived and unrelated suggestions. The proposal to 
which the report gives first priority supplies the most obvious illus-
tration. The students urge that the Commission, as its primary task, 
attack motivational-research advertising, since such advertising dis-
torts consumer choice and demand. But it is never made clear just 
why priority should be given to prohibiting advertisements which 
use subtle, psychological appeals and which rely upon strongly ir-
rational forces of human personality. The lack of supporting argu-
ment makes the conclusion especially questionable in light of the 
report's concession that such advertisements may not constitute 
either a "deceptive" or an "unfair" practice. Indeed, the students' 
advice seems to be about as bad as one could possibly give the Com-
mission today. It is true that if the FTC were to follow this advice, 
the noneconomic differentiation that such subtly persuasive advertis-
ing creates among closely related products would be removed from 
the competitive market. At first blush, that potential benefit seems to 
meet my earlier criticism that the report gives too little emphasis to 
the consumer benefits which result from the prosecution of anticom-
petitive forces.215 But the primary thrust of my suggestion was against 
aggrandizement and abuses of market power. The authors' major 
focus seems to be that such advertising persuades consumers to buy 
what they do not need or to make choices on nonrational grounds. 
Although I may agree with the students' view of most such advertise-
ments, I doubt that government should intervene in such a big-
brother fashion and that it should impose a "cultural tyranny" of 
intellectual taste.26 Indeed, after reading the students' expose, I am 
certain that I do not want the FTC deciding such delicate questions. 
Furthermore, it is unlikely that the Commission has the power to 
follow the advice, for it is highly doubtful that motivational-research 
advertising contravenes section 5 of the FTC Act.27 If the FTC were 
25. See text accompanying notes 9-17 supra. 
26. Cf. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 
U. PA. L. R.Ev. 485, 555-56 (1967). Professor Richard Posner, the dissenting member of 
the American Bar Association's FTC Study Commission, summarized another possible 
response to the motivational-research argument as follows: 
This "brainwashing" theory would be more plausible if there were a monopoly 
on advertising. In fact, advertisers compete for the consumer's patronage. One 
would expect the best products to win out in competition among advertisers, 
just as the market in ideas, a market also characterized by inflated claims, is as-
sumed to lead to the adoption of the best ideas. Why individuals can be trusted 
to make intelligent political choices, but not intelligent product choices, is not 
explained. 
Posner, Working Paper for the Task Force on Productitiity and Competition: Ad-
vertising and Product Differentiation, in PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON PRODUCTIVITY AND 
COMPETITION, REPORT (1969) (Stigler Report), reprinted in 5 TRADE REG. REP. ,J 50,250, 
at 55,527, 55,528 (1969). 
27. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964). One leading commentator has argued persuasively that 
the FTC's mandate regarding social values is more limited. Millstein, The Federal 
Trade Commission and False Advertising, 64 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 439, 444-45 (1964). He 
does suggest, however, that such advertisements raise questions whether the promise 
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to bring an action, would proof that the respondent's product is 
superior to co:i;npeting products-that is, that consumers are making 
· a wise choice but on nonrational grounds-be a defense? As long as 
consumers continue to be exploited by deceptive selling practices 
and as long as major industries continue to rely on misleading 
pricing methods, such as new car "sticker" prices and used car blue-
book prices, or on fraudulent sales techniques, such as those used in 
almost every installment sales contract, the Commission would be 
wasting its resources if it prosecuted such dubious violations. 
By even suggesting that the Commission should, as its first pri-
ority, attack such motivational-research advertisements, the authors 
reveal the superficiality of their analysis, for they vastly overestimate 
the capability of the Commission, which they accept at face value as 
a politically balanced, independent regulatory agency whose mem-
bers are appointed by the President and whose activities are funded 
by Congress.28 They seem unaware of the power which is possessed 
by those whom the Commission must police. Despite the size to 
which the advertising industry has grown, at least partially as a 
result of its ability to develop consumer product differentiation 
without significant product differences, the authors appear to expect 
the FTC to reduce advertising's role to its early, but long-abandoned, 
position as a mere information conduit. What would happen, for 
example, if the Commission implemented the students' suggestion 
that it prosecute the large television advertisers for their use of 
motivational.research advertisements? The answer seems obvious. 
The advertisers and advertising agencies would fight with all their 
resources such an attack upon the lifeblood of their business. Pro-
cedural delays and endless appeals would postpone any decision for 
at least a decade-long after the end of the advertising campaign 
which gave rise to the prosecution.29 It is doubtful that this ques-
tionable object is worth a commitment of a vast share of the FTC's 
"consumer" resources. Of course, the power of a recalcitrant corpo-
rate giant should not immunize it from suit even if the result might 
made by the advertisement is true and whether it has induced consumer action. Id. 
at 447-49; see Pollay, Deceptive Advertising and Consumer Behavior: A Case for Legis-
lative and Judicial Reform, 17 KAN. L. REv. 625 (1969). 
28. See generally w. CARY, PoLmcs AND THE REGULATORY AGENCIES 57, 63·64, 88-89, 
125 (1967). It is one thing to make a case for drastic changes in the Commission's 
direction and operation; it is another to evaluate its performance by a false standard 
and then to assail its failures. See note 33 infra. 
29. The classic case, of course, is the FTC's successful sixteen-year struggle to re-
move the word "liver" from Carter's Little Liver Pills, after the Commission had 
found that the pills had no connection with liver function. Carter Prods., Inc. v. 
FTC, 268 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1959). For a perceptive analysis of economic reality, the 
argument of the Nader Report, and the Commission's performance, see Travers, 
Foreword-Symposium: Federal Trade Commission Regulation of Deceptilie Advertis-
ing, 17 KAN. L. REv. 551 (1969). 
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impair its existence. Nor should that power justify either the Com-
mission's light caseload or its current attention to trivial violations 
by tiny firms. But adherence to the authors' ill-considered suggestion 
is not the solution. 
Other suggestions of simplistic solutions to complex questions 
also mar the Nader Report. The report charges that, because the 
FTC does not view business as its enemy, and because its members 
talk with trade groups, the Commission is coddling business. One 
gets the impression that the students consider such efforts to obtain 
cooperation improper. It is entirely legitimate to propose that Com-
mission members hear nonbusiness views, or that ex parte conversa-
tions be carefully restricted, but the implementation of those 
proposals hardly justifies limiting information exchanges with af-
fected business groups to formal rule-making or adjudicatory 
hearings. More disturbing is the report's apparent condemnation of 
the Commission's experimentation with voluntary and industry-wide 
enforcement efforts. The students' recommendations for preplanned 
prosecutions and for careful supervision of outstanding orders and 
consent decrees are indisputable. But the potential impact of vigor- · 
ous prosecution of individual cases will be quickly lost and will 
encourage unnecessary resistance if competitors are unfairly dis-
advantaged and voluntary procedures are not given attention.30 
These are difficult issues to which the Commission has given thought 
and leadership and with which it has experimented.31 Naturally, 
mistakes have occurred. But experience as well as statutory require-
ments support the Commission's basic approach. Similarly, the per-
plexing problem of delay in the Commission's processes cannot be 
solved by citing statistics; fair summary procedures need to be devel-
oped.32 Due process cannot be summarily swept aside by the purity 
of the reformer's zeal. 
As one reads the Nader Report, it becomes clear that what the 
students failed to perceive is that internal reform of the Commis-
sion-reform of its strategy and personnel-is not a panacea.33 
30. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, supra note 18, at 
1082-84. 
31. See, e.g., Elman, The Federal Trade Commission and the Administrative 
Process, 8 ANTITRUST BULL. 607 (1962); Jones, Industry-Wide Enforcement, 10 ANTITRusr 
BULL. 543 (1965); Millstein, supra note 27, at 493 8: n.269. 
32. See Gellhom, Proof of Consumer Deception Before the Federal Trade Com-
mission, 17 KAN. L. REY. 559-61 (1969). 
33. Professor Jaffe has summarized this point elsewhere as follows: 
American reformers-and perhaps Americans generally-lack patience and a 
sense of history. They are forever in search of gadgets and gimmicks. Profes-
sional liberals and liberal professors hailed the independent administrative agency 
as a patented engine for continuous reform. The formula was a body of experts, 
independent of political control by President and Congress, generously endowed 
with wide powers to regulate some industry or area in "the public interest." \Ve 
proposed to ourselves the notion that the problems in each of these fields could 
be reduced to technical questions. We knew of course that the establishment of 
each of these agencies had been preceded by years of controversy. Each enabling 
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Sweeping changes appear to be needed, and this report does suggest 
many of the places we need to look. Its suggestions, however, are by 
no means a complete catalog. I remain convinced, for example, that 
effective action will not be achieved until FTC procedure is over-
hauled and streamlined; but however constituted, the FTC will 
not perform miracles. Bold, even imaginative leadership, without 
regard to congressional views or public support, will not make much 
headway in attacking consumer problems. Independent agencies 
operate neither in a political vacuum nor from an independent 
power base.34 Indeed, as the FTC has learned from sad experience, 
straying too far from the accepted path results only in congressional 
reversal, fund starvation, and lost time.35 
These limitations in the Nader Report obviously interfere with 
its message. But they do not overwhelm it. The report deserves to 
be read carefully, and its recommendations need to be explored fur-
ther. Its primary value is as a call-to the FTC, to Congress, to the 
President, and to the public-that more can and must be done to 
protect the American consumer, that the FTC needs added authority 
to prevent and to curtail deceptive practices, and that the Commis-
sion can play an important role if it is adequately supported with 
funds and public attention. So long as the report is viewed as such 
a call, rather than as a judgment of FTC performance, it serves a 
valuable purpose. It is clear that the report says little that is wholly 
new. But in addition to repeating what many others have said be-
fore, it demands that its call not be ignored as the others have been. 
There is a medieval tale about a traveler who meets three stone-
cutters. He asks each what he is doing. The first responds, "I am 
cutting stone." The second stonecutter replies, "I am making a cor-
nerstone." And when the question is repeated to the third, he an-
swers, "I am building a cathedral." Nader's students have expressed 
statute was the resolution of an intense struggle for power. The statutory resolu-
tion was made possible only by an aroused public opinion. Yet somehow we 
believed that the statute once enacted, we could sit back and expect the con-
tinuing power confrontations to be posed as technical problems to be solved 
solely by "expertise." Of course it didn't work. And so disillusioned, but with the 
same impatience and shortsightedness, we fell to berating the agencies and calling 
them names (e.g., "industry oriented''). Once more we looked about for "solu-
tions"-for devices which would put the agencies back on the track of reform. 
"\\Te have been disinclined to consider the notion that these agencies, as is true of 
any other organs of government, could do some jobs and not others, had their 
fertile periods and their dry periods, shared, one might say, the infirmities of man. 
Jaffe, Book Review, 43 NOTRE DAME LAw. 614 (1968). 
34. See generally W. CARY, supra note 28. 
35. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-39 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968), overruling FTC Cigarette Label 
Warning Rule, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324-75 (1964). Early in its history the FTC outran its 
political support ,\ith disastrous consequences. See Herring, Politics, Personalities, and 
the Federal Trade Commission, 28 AM. PoL. Ser. REv. 1016 (1934); 29 AM. PoL. Sci. 
REv. 21 (1935). 
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the vision of the third stonecutter. Too often, however, their report 
looks like cut stone. Still, if their call is heard, they will have helped 
to lay the c~merstone for future progress. 
Ernest Gellhorn, 
Professor of Law, 
Duke University 
